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THE DUTY TO ACT: A PROPOSED RULE*
Wallace M. Rudolph **
The alienation of the individual from his fellows is becoming
the subject of more and more concern. Repeatedly persons
have stood by while thugs beat innocent victims. In one recent
case, thirty-eight known witnesses were asked why they allowed
a young woman to be assaulted and murdered. Their answer was
that they did not wish to be involved.' Similar occurrences are
easily cited. During the Korean War, for example, one soldier
threw two of his fellows out of their prison quarters because
they smelled so vilely from the dysentery with which they
were afflicted. Thirty-seven other soldiers did nothing, and the
two afflicted soldiers died of exposure.2
The first example demonstrates the failure of community
spirit among individuals in large units. The latter example dem-
onstrates that in a small community the lack of leadership, rules,
and sanctions can result in the same failure. In both these socie-
ties, there were neither moral nor legal sanctions to require one
person in the group to help another. We know, however, that
moral and legal sanctions can reinforce one another. Thus if
something is made illegal (such as hoarding during a war), both
the societal and individual controls may become stronger."
The reverse is also true. The failure of a society to punish
legally may lead to a complete breakdown of moral sanctions.4
* Professor Dale Broeder originally suggested the idea for this article and
all the proposed solutions were worked out jointly while he was my
colleague at the University of Nebraska. The article is to be in two
parts. Professor Broeder will write a critical analysis of the present
law; the other part is this article. Professor Broeder's part is forth-
coming.
** B.A., 1950, University of Chicago; J.D., 1953, University of Chicago.
Member of the Nebraska, Illinois, and American Bar Associations. In-
structor, University of Chicago College of Law, 1957-58. Professor of
Law, University of Nebraska.
1 N.Y. Times, March 27, 1964, p. 1, col. 4.
2 See Note, Misconduct in the Prison Camp, 56 COLUm. L. Rnv. 709, 758
n.355 (1956).
8 See generally Schwartz, Social Factors in the Development of Legal
Control: A Case Study of Two Israeli Settlements, 63 YALE L.J. 471
(1954).
4 Ibid.
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Such a breakdown was achieved by the Chinese in the Korean
prisoner of war camps. The Chinese followed an announced
policy of refusing to enforce normal military discipline within the
camp. Hence no soldier was required to obey a commissioned or
noncommissioned officer. This policy effectively destroyed the
moral and legal controls within the American prisoner of war
community. Destruction of these controls led to the largest
proportionate loss of life through disease and disorder ever to be
experienced by American prisoners of war.5
5 A revealing contrast is the experience of the Turkish forces during the
Korean War: "[Oif 7,190 United Nations prisoners captured by the
Communist forces, 2,730 died during their captivity, which in most
cases was less than two years. But, strikingly, of the 229 Turks taken
captive, not a single one died during captivity, although they experi-
enced exactly the same treatment and further notwithstanding the fact
that more than half were wounded on capture. If the Turks had ex-
perienced the same death rate as their allies, 87 Turks would have
perished. What spared the lives of these statistical 87 Turks? There
is evidence now that it may simply have been a question of prisoner
organization patterned to challenge and contain the hostile environ-
ment which enveloped them. The senior Turk took care to inform the
captors that he was in charge of the other Turks-that if he were to
be removed the next senior would assume charge and so on down to
the last two privates and, between them, the senior private would be
in charge. When a Turk became ill, he was nursed back to health by
the group and supplied with extra food and clothing sacrificed by the
group; when hospitalized, two Turks were detailed by the senior Turk
to go along and remain with the patient as chambermaid and champion
until he recovered. They shared clothing and food as need required
and attended to hygienic policing, all under supervision of the senior
Turk. The sanitation and other orders of the senior were rigidly en-
forced by the entire group. You might validly ask: 'But were not
these same basic health precautions, social decencies and military fun-
damentals followed by the other allies?' The aforementioned commit-
tee appointed by the Secretary of Defense was later to report of con-
ditions among American prisoners of war in Korea in the following
language: 'By design and because some officers refused to assume
leadership responsibility, organization in some of the POW camps
deteriorated to an every-man-for-himself situation. Some of the
camps became indescribably filthy. The men scuffled for their food.
Hoarders grabbed all the tobacco. Morale decayed to the vanishing
point. Each man mistrusted the next. Bullies persecuted the weak
and sick. Filth bred disease and contagion swept the camp. So men
died from lack of leadership and discipline.'" Manes, Barbed Wire
Command: The Legal Nature of the Command Responsibilities of the
Senior Prisoner in a Prisoner of War Camp, Military L. Rev., Oct. 1960,
p. 1, 3-4.
In response to this phenomenon Article IV of the Military Code
of Conduct was promulgated which states: "If I become a prisoner
of war, I will keep faith with my fellow prisoners. I will give no
information or take part in any action which might be harmful to
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Thus the anonymity of city life and the lack of legal sanctions
can cause the failure of moral sanctions. Law can have no effect
on the anonymity of city life. But a new approach by the law
could reinforce whatever moral sanctions do exist. And at the
very least, the law could protect persons who give way to their
better instincts. Under the present state of the law, an individual
would be foolish to come to the aid of a stranger, for if he made
the stranger's position worse, he would be liable." Moreover, if
my comrades. If I am senior, I will take command. If not, I
will obey the lawful orders of those appointed over me and will back
them up in every way." Id. at 46.
6 Exec. Order No. 10631, 20 Fed. Reg. 6057 (1955). RESTATEMENT, TORTS
§ 323 (1934), states: "(1) One who gratuitously renders services to
another, otherwise than by taking charge of him when helpless, is
subject to liability for bodily harm caused to the other by his failure,
while so doing, to exercise with reasonable care such competence and
skill as he possesses or leads the other reasonably to believe that he
possesses. (2) One who gratuitously renders services to another,
otherwise than by taking charge of him when helpless, is not subject
to liability for discontinuing the services if he does not thereby leave
the other in a worse position than he was in when the services were
begun."
To avoid the application of this rule to professionals various good
samaritan statutes have been passed. For example, the American
Medical Association law department reports that thirty-one states
have at this time some kind of legislation restricting liability for
negligence of professionals who voluntarily go to the aid of an injured
person. Note, Adrenalin for the "Good Samaritan," 13 DE PAUL L.
REV. 297 (1964). Such legislation indicates an unfortunate retreat
from the normal rule of ordinary care under negligence law. As
Governor Rockefeller stated in his veto of the proposed good samaritan
statute in New York: "It represents an undesirable lowering of the
standard of accepted conduct which has prevailed for many years.
To require a reasonable degree of care in all instances is a proper
standard since what is reasonable depends in any situation on all the
surrounding circumstances." Memorandum disapproving N.Y. Senate
Bill, Introductory No. 1602, Print No. 3384 (Apr. 30, 1962). Governor
Kerner of Illinois rejected similar legislation in Illinois. His veto mes-
sage states the cogent reasons against the adoption of such legislation
as follows:
"House Bill 1489 exempts any person licensed to practice medicine
in all of its branches in Illinois who in good faith provides emergency
care at the scene of an accident or emergency from any civil liability
as a result of negligence in providing such care.
"This is a type of statute that has come to be known as a 'Good
Samaritan Law,' and it has been adopted in one version or another
in almost half of the states. This has resulted from literature widely
circulated among doctors recounting the dire consequences in terms
of malpractice litigation that can result from a physician's humani-
tarian act in rendering emergency roadside care to an injured party.
So far as I can ascertain, the attendant danger to the physician is
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he went to the aid of another and were injured, he would not be
indemnified, nor would he be paid for his time.7 Only he who
does nothing is not liable.8
largely, if not wholly, imagined. A systematic inquiry into all of the
reported malpractice decisions has failed to disclose a single such
'roadside' instance. Nor do I entertain any doubt but that the courts
of the State, in such an action, would take into consideration all of
the attendant circumstances and would not permit the unfair treat-
ment of a physician who had responded to such an emergency.
"A leading text in the tort field has noted that the courts have
exhibited a tenderness to professional men that has 'few analogies
in modern accident law.' ... To treat physicians with understanding,
however, an approach with which I am in sympathy, is quite a differ-
ent thing from shielding them entirely from liability, regardless of the
carelessness exhibited or the damage occasioned thereby, which is
what this Bill does. The Bill of Rights of the Illinois Constitution
provides that 'Every person ought to find a certain remedy in the laws
for all injuries and wrongs which he may receive in his person, prop-
erty, or reputation' . . . Our courts have demonstrated an increasing
tendency to apply this policy so as to abolish traditional immunities
to liability enjoyed by governmental bodies .... I do not believe
that any class of citizens, be they physicians or otherwise, should
enjoy a superior position, legally insulated from the consequences of
their wrongful conduct.
"The essential unfairness of this type of statute can be appreciated
when it is considered that any private citizen untrained in first aid,
who volunteers in an emergency may be held legally accountable
for his actions, as may a nurse who is less trained than the physician.
But the doctor, who is the only one fully trained to render emergency
care, would be the very one rendered immune by this Bill from the
consequences of his negligent acts. And unlike the private citizen
who responds, the action of the physician is not wholly voluntary,
since fidelity to the precepts of his profession requires him in an
emergency to render service to the best of his ability." Memorandum
disapproving Ill. House Bill 1489 (Aug. 26, 1964).
The purpose of this article is to provide another method of ob-
taining emergency care without reducing the normal standards of
care required under existing law.
7 Hope, Officiousness (pts. 1 & 2), 15 CORNELL L.Q. 25, 205 (1929-1930).
A rescuer may be protected, however, if the person rescued was im-
periled by the negligence of a third party who caused the original
danger. Under the rule set down in Wagner v. International Ry.,
232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437 (1921), the possibility of rescue is one of
the forseeable consequences when A negligently endangers B. There-
fore, A may be liable to B's rescuer if the latter suffers any damages.
8 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 314 (1934) states: "The actor's realization that
action on his part is necessary for another's aid or protection does
not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such action."
This point is amply illustrated by Yania v. Bigan, 397 Pa. 316,
321-22, 155 A.2d 343, 346 (1959), where the court said: "The mere fact
that Bigan saw Yania in a position of peril in the water imposed upon
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The present rules of law offer no complete solution to the
problem, though three basic exceptions to the general rule that
there is no duty to act do exist. First, a person has a duty to act
whenever he has induced another to rely to his detriment upon a
gratuitous promise to act.9 Second, a person has a duty to act
whenever he has some special relationship to the person in need
of aid.10 Third, a person has a duty to act if he controls an active
force that may cause physical injury or if another is injured by
that active force." As we shall see, the first two categories arise
from general obligations which do not relate directly to a particu-
lar emergency. The third category, however, arises only in an
emergency and is not consistent with the present rule that there
is no duty to act.
The first category, that comprising the reliance cases, includes
two basic fact situations. In the first fact situation, the person
who needs help does not receive it because he who promised to
bring help fails to do so. Under the present rule, the person who
offered to bring help is liable for his failure to do so if other help
was actually available to the person in need of it. Hence the
rule does not operate when an emergency exists (if an emergency
may be defined as a situation in which no other help is available),
since one would not be liable if he alone were in a position to help
him no legal, although a moral, obligation or duty to go to his rescue
unless Bigan was legally responsible, in whole or in part, for placing
Yania in the perilous position.".
9 RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 324, 325 (1934) imposes a duty to act when-
ever a person acts in such a way as to lessen the injured party's
chance of receiving help.
10 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), AGENCY § 512 (1958): "(1) If a servant, while
acting within the scope of his employment, comes into a position of
imminent danger of serious harm and this is known to the master or
to a person who has duties of management, the master is subject to
liability for a failure by himself or by such person to exercise reason-
able care to avert the threatened harm. (2) If a servant is hurt and
thereby becomes helpless when acting within the scope of employment
and this is known to the master or to a person having duties of
management, the master is subject to liability for his negligent failure
or that of such person to give first aid to the servant and to care for
him until he can be cared for by others."
11 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 314, comment c (1934) is illustrative of this
point: "The rule stated in this Section applies only where the peril,
in which the actor knows that the other is placed, is not due to any
active force which is under the actor's control. If a force is within
the actor's control, his failure to control it is treated as though he
were actively directing it and not as a breach of duty to take affirma-
tive steps to prevent its continuance .... "
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the injured party or to bring help to him.12 The rule is thus more
closely connected to the doctrine of promissory estoppel than to a
general duty to act.13
Unlike the first, the second fact situation does impose a duty
to act when no other help is available. Thus an employer may
be required to give aid to an employee whenever the conditions of
employment have lessened the employee's chance of obtaining
help or have increased the probability that the employee would
be injured.14 Conversely the employer is under no duty to act if
12 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 325, illustrations 1 & 2 (1934): "1. A, a guest
in B's house, is seriously ill and in need of immediate medical atten-
tion. B calls C, a physician, on the telephone. C promises to come
immediately thereby causing B not to call other medical aid. C ne-
glects to pay the visit until several hours later; during all of which
time B waits expecting C's arrival. In consequence of the delay, A's
illness is increased by lack of immediate attention. C is liable to A
for the increased illness, irrespective of whether C's services were
gratuitous or for compensation. 2. Under the facts similar to those
given in Illustration 1, except that C was the only physician who could
reach A's bedside before the time at which C himself arrived, C would
not be liable to A, under the rule stated in this Section, if it was un-
derstood that C was not to be paid for his services."
1s Compare RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 325, illustration 1 (1934), with RE-
STATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 90, illustration 1 (1932): "A promises B not
to foreclose for a specified time, a mortgage which A holds on B's land.
B thereafter makes improvements on the land. A's promise is bind-
ing."
14 The best example of this relational duty is found in the doctrine of
maintenance and cure. Under that doctrine a ship is responsible
for the care of its seamen even though no fault is involved and no
contractual arrangements are made. ROBINSON, ADmiALTY § 36
(1939). Thus in Harris v. Pennsylvania R.R., 50 F.2d 866, 868 (4th
Cir. 1931), it was stated: "We are referred to no decisions involving
the bald question presented in the case at bar, although cases are
cited in which the negligent failure of a ship's crew to save a drowning
seaman has been treated as a material circumstance in determining
the obligation of the vessel.... But we have no doubt that a legal
obligation rests upon a ship to use due diligence to save one of the
crew, who, by his own neglect, falls into the sea; and that the owners
are liable if, by failure to perform this duty, his life is lost. The rea-
son is apparent when we consider the peculiar relationship of the sea-
man to his ship, which, irrespective of statute, has been recognized
from the earliest period. The general rules of master and servant
apply, but they are modified by the nature of the business. The con-
tract of employment involves not merely a surrender of the personal
liberty of the seaman to a greater extent than is customary . . . but
it imposes upon the employer an exceptional obligation to care for the
well-being of the crew." (Emphasis added.) See generally Bohlen,
The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability (pts. 1 & 2),
56 U. PA. L. REv. 217, 316 (1908).
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the employee's ability to obtain help was not lessened by the
employment or if the risk of injury was not increased by the
employment. 15 There is no doctrinal problem in imposing such a
duty on employers. For the law can say that this duty to act was
voluntarily assumed by the employer through the employment
contract, that it was imposed by law under the workmen's com-
pensation laws, or that it arose under tort law because the em-
ployer induced the employee to leave a place where he could take
care of his wants to go to a place where he was helpless to provide
for his own protection. In any case, the law has no difficulty
in finding that the employer has voluntarily assumed a duty to
act 16 and does not have to solve the problem of whether the em-
ployer should be indemnified for the cost of acting.
The second exception to the general rule that there is no duty
to act actually imposes a duty to act in cases of special relation-
ships. Thus even when no emergency exists, one person may
have a general duty to succor and support another.'7 For exam-
ple, a father who has a general duty to support his child must act
to save that child from danger.18 In addition, the normal family
law doctrine that services given within the family are gratuitous
eliminates all problems of indemnification or compensation for
the person required to act. 19 It is interesting to note in this con-
15 Ibid.
16 "Where the accident occurs by pure unavoidable mischance, or through
the negligence of a fellow-servant, it is submitted that to hold master
to care to extricate the servant from his perilous position involves no
novel extension of the master's duties, but results merely from the
application to the particular facts of the general principles underlying
the duties incident to all mutually beneficial relations voluntarily en-
tered into, and so to the particular relation of master and servant,
which is but one of them. Where, howover [sic], the plaintiff has
by his own negligence contributed to bring about the accident which
imperils him, or has known and so assumed the risk of that defect
in the machinery whereby he is injured, his right to recover may
appear more doubtful; but once concede the general duty to provide
for the relief of injured or imperiled employees and it seems plain
that, though the plaintiff's negligence has contributed to cause the
original accident, the defendant has had the last chance to prevent
the injury by the proper performance of his legal duties." Bohlen,
supra note 14, at 330-32. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY
§ 512 (1958).
17 Rex v. Russell, [1933] Vict. L.R. 59, 47 HAv. L. REV. 531 (1934). The
defendant, although offering no encouragement or persuasion, never-
theless stood by and watched his wife drown their two infant children
and then herself. It was held that he was guilty of manslaughter.
18 NEB. REV. STAT. § 13-106 (Reissue 1962).
19 34 C.J.S. Executors and Administrators § 371 (1942).
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text that the law does impose a duty to act and that such a duty
would not be required if there were any validity in the belief that
the duty to act is only a moral obligation. Certainly one would
expect that moral obligations would be more efficacious than legal
obligations within the family; but the law assumes the contrary.
As we have seen, neither the reliance rules nor the special
relations rules depend for their validity upon a general duty to
act in an emergency. Each rule is simply the rational implica-
tion of a particular legal concept. This is not true of the third
exception to the general rule that there is no duty to act. For
a duty to act is imposed upon any person who controls an object
or force which may cause an injury or which has caused an
injury."0  Thus we have the last clear chance rule. Under that
20 This category does not include cases where the duty to act is imposed
by prior negligence or where the duty to act is imposed because the
active agent is a product that is especially dangerous or is warranted
to be fit for a particular purpose. The duty to act in such cases
arises either because of the general duty to mitigate damages for
which a person is already liable or because the warranty has induced
reliance on the user. In neither case does the duty to act arise be-
cause of an emergency or because no other person or group of persons
are in the position to act. Restatement of Torts sections covering
these cases are:
(1) RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 314, illustrations 2 & 3 (1934):
"2. A, a factory owner, sees B, a young child or blind man who
has wandered into his factory, about to approach a piece of moving
machinery. A is guilty of negligence if he permits the machinery to
continue in motion when by the exercise of reasonable care he could
stop it before B comes in contact with it. 3. A, a trespasser in the
freight yard of the B Railroad Company, falls beneath a slowly mov-
ing train. The conductor of the train sees A and by signalling the
engineer could readily stop the train in time to prevent its running
over A, but does not do so. While a bystander might not be liable
to A for deliberately refusing to help him from under the train, the
B railroad is liable for permitting the train to continue in motion with
knowledge of A's peril."
(2) RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 321 (1934):
"If the actor does an act, which at the time he has no reason to
believe will involve an unreasonable risk of causing bodily harm to
another, but which, because of a change of circumstances or fuller
knowledge acquired by the actor, he subsequently realizes or should
realize as involving such a risk, the actor is under a duty to use
reasonable care to prevent the risk from taking effect."
(3) RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 322 (1934):
"If the actor by his tortious conduct has caused such bodily harm
to another as to make him helpless, the actor is under a duty to use
reasonable care to prevent any further harm which the actor then
realizes or should realize as threatening the other.
"Caveat: The Institute expresses no opinion as to the existence
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rule, a person who is driving an automobile in a safe manner
must give way to a wanton driver if by giving way the former
can prevent an accident. The only feasible rationale for this rule
is that the safe driver alone has the power to prevent the accident
and hence a duty to do so. This same rationale ought to apply
whenever an act as simple as a warning could prevent an acci-
dent. Thus a passer-by who sees that a person is about to walk
into a hole ought to be obligated to speak in order to save that
person from harm. But this rationale does not prevail for the
simple reason that the law has not solved the problems that
would arise if duties of this kind were imposed.
Attempts to solve the problems raised by a duty to act rule
have been made. And criminal sanctions to impose such a duty
have appeared in most civil law countries and in the Soviet
Union.21 In addition, France and Germany have begun to work
or nonexistence of a similar duty to aid or protect one whom the
actor's non-tortious conduct has rendered helpless to aid or protect
himself."
21 "DuTcH PENAL CODE, Art. 450. One who, witnessing the danger of
death with which another is suddenly threatened, neglects to give or
furnish him such assistance as he can give or procure without rea-
sonable fear of danger to himself or to others, is to be punished, if
the death of the person in distress follows, by a detention of three
months at most and an amende of three hundred florins at most.
"FRENCH PENAL CODE, Art. 63, paragraph 2 (enacted 1945) pro-
vides penalties by fine or imprisonment up to three years against one
who abstains voluntarily from giving to a person in peril such aid, by
personal action or by calling for help, as he could give without risk
to himself or another." SEAVEY, KEETON & KEETON, CASES ON TORTS
187-88 (2d ed. 1964).
The German Criminal Code provides: '"hoever does not ren-
der help in cases of accident, common danger or necessity although
help is required and under the circumstances is exactable, and in
particular is possible without danger of serious injury to himself and
without violation of other important [wichtige] duties, will be
punished by imprisonment up to one year or by fine." Dawson,
Negotiorum Gestio: The Altruistic Intermeddler, 74 I-IAv. L. REv.
1073, 1104-05 (1961). See also id. at 1105 nn.75-76; Comment, The
Failure to Rescue: A Comparative Study, 52 CoLum. L. REV. 631
(1952).
"The life salvor is a problem of law and morality. The general
maritime law, like the common law, 'does not compel active benevo-
lence between man and man,' and 'it is left to one's conscience whether
he shall be the Good Samaritan or not.' Although the most elementary
instincts of humanity seemingly impose a duty to assist those in dis-
tress on the watery highways of the world, it was not until 1910 that
the great maritime nations of the world agreed to put legal compul-
sion behind this obvious moral obligation. In that year the Interna-
tional Salvage Convention proposed the imposition of a duty upon
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out a scheme of compensation for persons who obey the duty to
act rule or who volunteer to save the life of another.2 2 With the
assurance from the European experience that an obligatory duty
each ship master, 'so far as he can do so without serious danger to
his vessel, her crew and passengers, to render assistance to everybody,
even though an enemy, found at sea in danger of being lost.' Ful-
filling its responsibility as a Convention signatory, the United States
enacted this proposal into the Salvage Act of 1912, providing for the
fining and imprisonment of violators. But while a master is threat-
ened with a criminal penalty for failing to save the lives of others,
performance of this duty does not bring him material reward. More-
over, there is no provision for repayment of any loss the master,
shipowner, or crew may suffer in saving lives. That maritime law
should reward the property salvor, but not the life salvor, is a paradox
that requires an examination of the fundamental elements of the
salvage concept in general, and the life salvage concept in particular."
Jarett, The Life Salvor Problem in Admiralty, 63 YALE L.J. 779, 779-
80 (1954).
"TURKISH CRIMINAL CODE art. 476 ('wounded or otherwise in
danger of his life'); ITAiAx CRIMINAL CODE art. 593 ('wounded or
otherwise in peril'); POLISH CRIMINAL CODE art. 247 ('in a situation
directly endangering life'); DANISH CaMINAL CODE art. 253 ('evident
peril to life'); RUMANIAN CRIMINAL CODE art. 489 ('in danger of death');
NORWEGIAN CRMINAL CODE art. 387 ('evident and immediate danger
of death'); PORTUGUESE CRIMINAL CODE art. 2368. The Norwegian and
Portuguese provisions appear in CoHIN, L'ABSTENTION FAUTIVE EN
DROIT CIVnI ET PENAL 252-53, 256 (1929). The Portuguese provision
applies only to cases where the person in danger has been 'attacked
with violence.'
"The vacillations of Russian doctrinal writers on this question
are discussed by Hazard, Soviet Socialism and the Duty to Rescue, in
TWENTIETH CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAw-EssAys IN
HONOR OF HESSEL E. YNTEMA 160 (1961)." Dawson, supra note 21, at
1105 n.76.
22 "One question inevitably raised by legislation of this kind is whether
the standard of conduct defined by the criminal law is carried over to
the law of tort to permit recovery of damages against the person who
commits a crime in refusing aid. I have found no German decisions
that permit this translation of criminal into civil liability. In one
trial-court decision in France, however, the accused in a criminal case
had walked away from the scene when his son-in-law fell through
ice into a deep canal. The accused also refused, despite the son-in-
law's 'peril of death,' to join with a third person in handing out to
him a nearby iron bar to which the son-in-law might cling. For this
unkindness, excessive even in a father-in-law, the accused was sent to
jail for three years. But the son-in-law had apparently managed
to scramble out of the icy water, for he appeared in the action as
partie civile and recovered 25,000 francs from his impervious father-
in-law. The general conclusion that the standards of the criminal
law define fault for the purposes of damage liability has the strong
support of the leading modern French authors on tort liability." Daw-
son, supra note 21, at 1107-08.
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to act is workable, we have attempted to formulate a duty to act
rule which would fit within the present common law pattern.
After a statement of the rule, we will discuss its application to
the major problems of compensation, indemnification, diffuse re-
sponsibility, and officious intermeddlers.
The rule:
A person has a duty to act whenever:
1. The harm or loss is imminent and there is apparently no
other practical alternative to avoid the threatened harm or
loss except his own action;
2. Failure to act would result in substantial harm or damage
to another person or his property and the effort, risk, or
cost of acting is disproportionately less than the harm or
damage avoided; and
8. The circumstances placing the person in a position to act
are purely fortuitous.
In developing this rule, no attempt has been made or, in our
opinion, should be made to alter the existing scheme of social
distribution. Such changes in distributive justice, the proper
share each person should have in society, as opposed to retribu-
tive justice, the re-establishment of shares to persons who have
been deprived of. them by a wrongful act, are, as Aristotle
pointed out in his Ethics, for the legislature and not for the
courts.2 3
The proposed rule does not require a rich man to give money
simply because a poor man is without funds. Nor does it apply
to the classic hypothetical of the starving. beggar who asks the
millionaire for money in order to avoid starvation. If the rich
man had food with him, he might be required to share it, for the
presence of food would be purely fortuitous and within condition
three of our rule. But he is not required to share his money,
because a man's wealth is not a fortuity. Since his situation does
not satisfy condition three of the rule, to impose a duty to act
upon him would render him subject at all times- to sharing his
wealth with his less fortunate brethren. This would involve dis-
tributive and not retributive justice and would not be con-
sistent with the policy behind the rule. But this does not mean
23 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN Ermcs-Boox V, in MoRRIs, THE GREAT LE-
GAL PmLOSOPHERS 16 (1959). Here Aristotle distinguishes between
retributive and distributive justice.
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that money could not at times be required. If money alone could
solve the problem and were it purely fortuitous that a particular
person was chosen to give, then money could be required. Thus
though condition three protects the classic rich from being obli-
gated to the classic poor, it does allow, under limited circum-
stances, a person of means who is temporarily without funds to
require someone else to lend him money, if the resources to be
saved by lending the money exceed substantially the risk of losing
the money.
It has been suggested that the law today is inconsistent, un-
fair, and at odds with the best moral thinking of the community.
On the one hand, the citizen has been taught consideration for
others and love of his fellow man. Yet if he acts according to
these teachings, he may be punished by the very society which
propagates them. Of all persons, the volunteer is the least pro-
tected by the law. He seems always to be treated as an officious
intermeddler. He is treated thus because the courts fear that
to alter the present law would be to open a Pandora's box of new
legal problems. 24 For example, would the party who benefited
24 "Because of this reluctance to countenance 'nonfeasance' as a basis
of liability, the law has persistently refused to recognize the moral
obligation of common decency and common humanity, to come to the
aid of another human being who is in danger, even though the out-
come is to cost him his life. Some of the decisions have been shocking
in the extreme. The expert swimmer, with a boat and a rope at hand,
who sees another drowning before his eyes, is not required to do any-
thing at all about it, but may sit on the dock, smoke his cigarette,
and watch the man drown. A physician is under no duty to answer
the call of one who is dying and might be saved, nor is anyone re-
quired to play the part of Florence Nightingale and bind up the
wounds of a stranger who is bleeding to death, or to prevent a neigh-
bor's child from hammering on a dangerous explosive, or to remove
a stone from the highway where it is a menace to traffic, or a train
from a place where it blocks a fire engine on its way to save a house,
or even to cry a warning to one who is walking into the jaws of a
dangerous machine. The remedy in such cases is left to the 'higher
law' and the 'voice of conscience,' which, in a wicked world, would
seem to be singularly ineffective either to prevent the harm or to com-
pensate the victim.
"Such decisions are revolting to any moral sense. They have
been denounced with vigor by legal writers. Thus far the difficulties
of setting any standards of unselfish service to fellow men, and of
making any workable rule to cover possible situations where fifty
people might fail to rescue one, has limited any tendency to depart
from the rule to cases where some special relation between the par-
ties has afforded a justification for the creation of a duty, without
any question of setting up a rule of universal application." PROSSER,
TORTS § 54, at 336-37 (3d ed. 1964).
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by an act performed under duty be required to pay for its per-
formance? If so, what should be the rate? the value to him?
the cost to the person acting? If the latter, what happens when
the result of the action is detrimental even though the action was
not negligently performed? In addition, what happens when in
performance of this duty the person acting is injured? Is he in-
demnified? fully? partially? only when the person helped has
been negligent? not at all? Suppose further that the first per-
son with a duty to act fails to act and a second person acts in his
stead and is injured. Who should pay for the loss? the person
benefited by the act of the injured party or the person who pre-
viously refused to act? and what of the problem of diffuse respon-
sibility? This problem may be illustrated by the drowning man
at a crowded beach. In all the crowd, who is responsible for
saving him? Notwithstanding the difficult problems that a change
in the rule of conduct concerning the duty to act would entail,
we believe that these problems can be solved and that the solu-
tions lie in orthodox common law rules.
Admittedly, this rule does reverse the common law rule con-
cerning the duty to act, but it in no way changes any other rules
of law. For example, where the law of damages does not allow
recovery for economic losses, emotional injury and the like, a per-
son who failed to act would not be responsible for such damages.
As a rule, such a person would not be liable for more damages
for failure to act under the proposed rule than he would be for
acting voluntarily and negligently under the present rules.
In addition, we recognize certain other exceptions to the gen-
eral rule. Such exceptions relate to bodily security and personal
rights. Ordinarily a person who is opposed to the transfusion of
blood should not be held liable for failure to give blood, even
though his failure resulted in a loss of life. In a society where
the belief in the sanctity of bodily security were less strongly
entrenched, the duty to give blood might be imposed. But even
in our society, the professional donor or any other person who
has already begun to give blood could logically be required to
continue to do so. In both these cases, the parties have indicated
(by giving blood) that their bodily security was subordinate to
some other interest. This other interest would have to be judged
by determining whether it involved something disproportionately
less important than the interest to be served by giving blood.
Personal rights, such as the right against self-incrimination,
are also not changed by the rule. Although a witness may be
required to testify under the rule, he may still claim the fifth
amendment even though his testimony could clear a person of a
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charge of murder. Thus, too, a man present at a gambling estab-
lishment or a house of prostitution could still claim the fifth
amendment (assuming gambling and fornication are illegal)
when asked to testify concerning a murder which had taken place
on the premises.
Thus the claim to bodily security and personal rights would
ordinarily excuse the individual from his duty to act. Religious
beliefs, on the other hand, would not be considered absolute ex-
cuses. Thus the orthodox Jew may have to exert effort on
Saturday and the Christian Scientist may have to bring medical
help. This is so for several reasons. In most cases, the religions
themselves have provided for excuses in emergency situations.
Then, too, subjective standards are difficult to apply. Only
where a belief, such as that involving bodily security or monog-
amy in marriage, has been accepted by the entire society is
it accorded the status of an absolute excuse. These excuses are
treated separately from the three conditions of the rule because
they are absolute. Under the rule, all other excuses are relative,
and the cost or effort of the person required to act is judged only
in relationship to the harm or damage to be avoided: the greater
the harm or damage possible, the greater the duty to act. Thus
we can say only that there can occur no harm or damage great
enough to force the abdication of personal rights or bodily se-
curity or that such rights are absolute and outside the scope of
the rule. Religious beliefs can make no such claim.
The exceptions which we have been discussing, if they are
exceptions, would affect the application of the rule in very few
cases. Because the rule changes legal relationships, however,
problems will arise concerning the legal consequences which
should attend breach. These problems concern the awarding of
damages against the person required to act and the relationships
of third parties to the persons directly affected by the rule.
The problems of relationship, which include questions of com-
pensation, indemnification, subrogation, proximate cause, and
damages, can best be discussed through examples. The major
distinctions arise in the respective applications of the rule to
professionals and amateurs. Because under the rule they would
be treated differently, the application of the rule to each group
will be discussed separately.
DUTY OF PROFESSIONAL TO ACT
The term "professional" is easily defined for our purposes.
He is a person who holds himself out to the general public as
willing and able to do a certain kind of work for a fee. Thus a
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doctor, a lawyer, a carpenter, a plumber, or a tree surgeon is a
professional when the work or act he is asked to do relates to
the normal work he does for a fee. Conversely a doctor is not a
professional if he is required to repair the plumbing nor is a car-
penter a professional if he is asked to mend a leg. Let us now
proceed to the easiest hypothetical case-that involving a doctor.
Suppose D, a doctor (whose name appears, by chance, as the
first one in the yellow pages), receives a call from P, a patient, at
1:00 o'clock in the morning. P complains of pains on the right
side, says that he is unable to move, and insists that the doctor
come to see him. P also states that his house has been quaran-
tined by the health authorities because of measles, which P's son
has contracted, and that he is heavily in debt and has no funds
with which to pay D. D answers that he does not make house
calls, but that he will come if P agrees to pay him five times his
usual fee in cash when he arrives and to indemnify him against
the risk of catching measles. D insists on this indemnity because
he has not been inoculated against measles. P says that he cannot
raise the money nor can he grant the indemnity. In reply, D
tells him to call another doctor.
After considerable delay, P contacts another doctor, S. By the
time S arrives, P's appendix has burst and he dies insolvent. The
second doctor, S, catches measles and his eyesight is affected.
P's administrator and S both sue D in a jurisdiction that has
adopted the proposed rule.
In defense of the complaints, D moves to dismiss, stating
that:
1. P had no money to pay him and therefore he had no
duty to act.
2. P had refused to pay him a fee five times greater than his
usual fee because of P's need of D's services.
3. D was an employee of an organization, such as a prepay
medical group or a governmental organization, which forbade him
from treating persons not in the eligible group, which P was not.
4. P was a member of a race that was personally repulsive
to him, a Caucasian, and as a member of the secret Black Muslim
Society he had .sworn not to have any dealing with members of
the white race.
5. D was being called upon in emergency cases more than
other doctors because his was the first name in the alphabetical
list of doctors.
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6. Treating P involved too great a risk of catching measles,
a disease for which D had neglected to be immunized.
7. D had retired from practice three months earlier and the
only reason that he was listed in the classified section was that
the new phone books had not yet been published.
8. D had told P that he had arranged to have R, a young
doctor, take his emergency calls and had given R's number to P.
9. D owes no legal duty to the second doctor.
What is the ruling on the first defense? Normally one does
not have to do business with a person who may not be able to
pay for the service required. Even public utilities are not re-
quired to give services away and the thirteenth amendment for-
bids involuntary servitude. Yet in applying the rule to this de-
fense, we find that the doctor is required to act. P met every
requirement of the rule: harm was imminent (a burst appen-
dix), failure to act could cause death, and no facts show that
D was receiving a disproportionate share of the emergency busi-
ness. The risks to D were that he might contract measles and
that he might not be able to collect his fee. But the possible loss
of a fee or the contracting of a disease cannot compare with the
loss of life itself. In addition, it is clear that the moral sense of
the community, even under the present rules, would move most
men to act in this situation.
If the first defense fails, so must the second defense. Hence
the only issue is whether in an emergency situation one person
may with impunity take advantage of another. The answer,
of course, is no. The law of duress would allow the party
agreeing to the extortionate charge to refuse to pay the agreed
price or to recover such payment. 5 In all other ways, the same
25 See Post v. Jones, 60 U.S. 150 (1856). In this case "salvors" would
not give assistance to a stranded whaling vessel, unless the vessel were
sold to them at a very profitable price. The original owner was en-
titled to libel the vessel to set aside the sale. In discussing the case
Mr. Justice Grier stated: "The crew were glad to escape with their
lives. The ship and cargo, though not actually derelict, must neces-
sarily have been abandoned. The contrivance of an auction sale,
under such circumstances, where the master of the Richmond was
hopeless, helpless, and passive-where there was no market, no mon-
ey, no competition-where one party had absolute power, and the
other no choice but submission-where the vendor must take what
is offered or get nothing-is a transaction which has no characteristic
of a valid contract .... The general interests of commerce will be
much better promoted by requiring the salvor to trust for compensa-
tion to the liberal recompense usually awarded by courts for such
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problems concerning duty to act which surrounded the first de-
fense arise here as well.
The third defense, that D had contracted with either a pre-
.pay group or a governmental group to treat only eligible per-
sons, could not in any way affect D's duty to act. Individual
contract rights, as in the case of inpecuniosity, cannot excuse a
person from acting in an emergency situation. The only possible
question raised by this contract is whether the prepay group or
the government is entitled to the fee for treating the sick in-
dividual. 26
The fourth defense, that of personal prejudice, is not dif-
ficult to handle. Although one of our basic freedoms seems to
be the freedom to dislike whom we choose to dislike, statutes in
the public utility field have made nondiscrimination a primary
duty because of the partial monopoly position of such utilities.2 7
Furthermore, the common law has required nondiscrimination of
inns, restaurants, and other establishments affected with a public
interest. Certainly in a more obviously monopolistic situation-
e.g., an emergency-where no alternate source of supply exists
for the services required, a rule of nondiscrimination ought to be
applied. This rule should apply whether the animosity were
individual or directed at a group of persons such as that men-
tioned in the fourth defense. Again the only possible argument
that can be made for this defense is that it relates to inviolable
religious beliefs or bodily security. In a country devoted to the
notion of equal citizenship, this viewpoint is, of course, inadmis-
sible. In an orthodox Hindu country such as pre-independence
India, however, where the cost or damage caused by contact with
an untouchable might be greater than the loss or damage to the
untouchable if the higher caste person did not act, this same view-
point might be acceptable. 28
services. We are of opinion, therefore, that the claimants have not
obtained a valid title to the property in dispute, but must be treated as
salvors." Id. at 159-60.
For a comparable emergency in the business field, see King
Constr. Co. v. W. AL Smith Elec. Co., 350 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. Civ. App.
1961).
26 See United States v. Drumm, 329 F.2d 109 (1st Cir. 1964). In this
case a government inspector was required to account to the govern-
ment for the salary. he received for part-time work with a company
he was required to inspect. See also Bennett--Pacaud Co. v. Dunlop,[1933] Ont. 246, [1933] 2 D.L.R. 237, where one working for another
unknown to his principal was required to account.
27 See 41 Stat. 474 (1920), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1(4), 2, 3 (1958).
28 This relates to the efficacies of religious beliefs. Thus if helping an
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The fifth defense, that D was being called more often
than other doctors, is more difficult to handle. D might argue
that the fortuity requirement has not been met when he is re-
peatedly called because his name appears at the beginning of a
list of doctors. The spelling of his name is itself a fortuity, how-
ever, and D must accept the disadvantages of being the first
doctor listed in the phone book along with the advantages which
have undoubtedly accrued to him by reason of occupying that
position.
The sixth defense, that the risk placed upon D is too great,
raises problems even within the rule. First, in applying the rule,
we can see that no person has a duty to act if such action imposes
upon him risks comparable in nature to the risk to be avoided.
Indeed since the risk to D was considerably greater because he
had not been inoculated than the risk to inoculated persons
would be, D would not be required to go unless no inocu-
lated persons were available. This latter instance does no more
than restate the rule involving emergencies, for except in cases
of diffuse responsibility, no emergency exists when other help is
available. In a diffuse responsibility case, however, if the same
call were made to a clinic where one doctor was inoculated and
the other doctor was not, then only the doctor who was inocu-
lated would be required to go. But this latter circumstance is not
really an exception to the rule, since under requirement two the
inoculated doctor would be more eligible because no harm would
befall him. If, on the other hand, the clinic contained either two
inoculated or two uninoculated doctors, the doctor receiving the
call would be obliged to go. A further discussion of the problem
of diffuse responsibility will follow.
The sixth defense must ultimately fail because the conditions
are such that the danger to D which comes of exposure to measles
is disproportionately less than the danger to P of a burst appen-
dix. The rule clearly states that the danger to the person re-
quired to act must be disproportionately less than the danger or
the damage to be avoided by the required act. But the question
arises as to whether a different standard of judgment should
apply in the case of a professional than in the case of the non-
professional. For the rule .applies equally to professionals and
untouchable would pollute a high caste Indian, the cost of the de-
pollution would have to be considered in judging whether what was
to be saved was worth the cost under section two of the rule. If a
life were at stake, the high caste Indian would be required to act,
but he might not be required to act if other untouchables were avail-
able to help.
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nonprofessionals, but the standards of measuring danger differ
depending upon the actor's ability to handle the danger. Thus a
professional would be required to act even in the presence of con-
siderable danger, whereas the nonprofessional would not be re-
quired to act. This circumstance may be explained in two ways.
First, some risks are normal for the professional. The rule may
require a test pilot to fly an experimental plane in an emergency,
whereas the rule would not require an amateur pilot to fly under
similar circumstances. Second, the risk to the professional is ac-
tually less due to his superior skill, training, or preparation.
Surely the test pilot would be more capable of coping with an
emergency than an amateur pilot. And certainly a doctor would
know better than the layman how best to minimize the danger of
contagion and how best to cure himself if he were taken ill. Thus
what on the surface would seem to be a variable standard of
duty would actually be the same standard applied to persons of
different skills. In the final analysis, then, a standard which re-
quires a slightly greater actual risk could be imposed upon the
professional if the risk related directly to and were characteristic
of his profession. In the situation described above, for example,
one must admit that for a doctor the risk of contagion is normal
and that by becoming a doctor one consents to expose himself to
such risks.
The seventh defense, that D had retired from practice,
raises a question basic to the right of freedom of occupation.
Certainly the rule concerning the duty to act involves involuntary
servitude; but because the rule applies only to emergencies, one
may disregard the modest limits imposed on freedom of occupa-
tion. Thus in the preseht case, the doctor is called simply be-
cause he is a doctor. That he is retired is purely fortuitous.
But the fundamental right of a person to choose his own work is
at stake. To impose a higher duty on a retired doctor than on a
layman would seem to be an insupportable infringement of free-
dom. What then of the case of a doctor who has perfected a
particularly difficult operation which only he can perform? Per-
haps he has now become an artist and has decided to give up
medicine and devote his life to painting. Ought a patient who
requires such an operation be left to die because the doctor has
become an artist?
From the point of view of the patient, the rule should apply.
The loss of his life is imminent, and he has no other alternative.
The failure of the doctor to act would accordingly create a loss
disproportionate to the cost to the doctor of completing the opera-
tion. Moreover, that the patient has contracted the disease is
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purely fortuitous. From the point of view of the doctor, how-
ever, the requirement of his services is not fortuitous. He carries
his skills with him and thus he would be continually subject to
call. Indeed, the case of the doctor is like that of the rich man in
the earlier example. Instead of having to distribute money to the
poor, however, the doctor would be required to distribute his time
(a good more valuable than money) 29 among those needing his
services. Thus according to part three of the rule, he is not re-
quired to act, for the duty to act arises only when the circum-
stances on both sides are fortuitous. In the hypothetical case, the
choice of the doctor is not fortuitous and would interfere with his
chosen occupation. He is required to act only if the circumstances
are truly fortuitous. Why then do we make professionals respond
to emergency calls? Because by choice they have held themselves
out to the public as willing to supply the service. Furthermore,
in some cases (e.g., doctors, lawyers, architects, and plumbers), the
professional has even asked the state to limit the number of per-
sons able to supply the service.3 0 Certainly, then, members of
such professions and trades ought to be required to act in emer-
gency situations. Presumably carrying out their profession is
what they wish to do. There is no special loss of freedom, but
only a possible rearrangement of time.
To recapitulate, then, we see that under certain circumstances
a professional has a duty to act, but that he may desist from any
particular employment. The problem that remains, however, is
whether the "monopolist" professional (i.e., the professional who
has mastered a particular skill) has a duty to act. The answer is
that he may refuse to act if the call upon him is not fortuitous;
otherwise he would be continuously subject to the demands of
others. For unlike the general run of professionals, he could not
substitute emergency work for planned work. But like every
other citizen, he would be subject to emergency calls that were
fortuitous. In the usual course of practice, however, he could not
be called upon to treat everyone who needed his particular skill,
since the need for such treatment is not an emergency but a gen-
eral condition of the community. As we stated earlier, such econom-
ic problems are beyond the scope of tort law. Our rule applies
only to emergency situations.
29 We must realize that each person has a finite period of time to live
and, although money is not infinite, some very rich people might find
it impossible to spend their fortunes.
SO Most states have statutes requiring licensing and specialized education.
Under such circumstances the number of persons entering the pro-
fessions have been limited. The American Medical Association has
been accused of attempting to limit entrance into the field of medicine.
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The eighth defense, that D had supplied an adequate sub-
stitute, is a valid defense if D in fact believed that the sub-
stitute were adequate and could be contacted as easily as D.
In most situations, however, no substitute will be available, for
due to the nature of an emergency, time will prevent it. Un-
doubtedly normal emergency facilities will take care of most
cases.3 ' And if these are available, no duty to act exists.
The eighth defense arises from the second doctor's suit against
D. For coming to P's aid and for losing time because he was ill
with measles, S, the second doctor, is suing for fees. As to the
first claim, D could not be primarily liable. P, not D, called for
the services. Nevertheless, D had a duty to attend, for he could
not establish either defense 5 (i.e., too great a risk) or 6 (i.e.,
retirement). If D had this duty, he could not forsake it without
having to compensate the person who did discharge the duty. To
test this proposition, let us assume the additional fact that P was
a prepaid contract patient of D. Would not S have a right to look
to D if P could not pay him? S could at least force P to assign to
him P's chose in action against D.32 Under the new rule, D's duty
to act is the same as though he had a contracted duty to act, and
S, therefore, should be able to look to D as a guarantor of P's
obligation to pay S. What then of S's injury, i.e., the measles
contracted while attempting to treat P? In this case, S, like D, is
a professional. S, therefore, could be reimbursed for his injuries
only if all professionals received compensation for injuries sus-
tained while carrying on their professions. Normally profes-
sionals are not indemnified or reimbursed for injuries character-
istic of their professions on the theory that their fee covers the
amount necessary to compensate them for the risk. This princi-
ple is, of course, the opposite of that applicable to employees,
unskilled workers, or amateurs. Whether the rule is based upon
recognition of the professional's skill, knowledge, control, or the
fact that his fee includes an insurance factor, the application of
the rule that no compensation will be allowed for injuries in-
curred by a professional while discharging his duty to act seems
clearly indicated. Hence under proper application of the rule, S
may recover only the amount of his fee from D, and he may do so
only if P is unable to make the payment.
33 Most cities have emergency service through either fire or police de-
partments or public hospitals. Thus certain persons are in the business
of answering emergency calls. Whenever they were available, such
persons would have a greater duty to act than would a bystander.
32 RESTATEmENT, CoNTRACTs § 151 (1932).
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DUTY OF AMATEUR TO ACT
Thus far we have considered only the case of the professional.
From that discussion, we discerned that for nonprofessionals dif-
ferent rules apply in regard to compensation for services, indem-
nification for injuries, and the conditions under which the duty is
imposed. Most other considerations apply equally to amateurs
and professionals, including the problem of diffuse responsibility
discussed below. Since the operation of the rule can best be
understood through illustration, we turn again to a hypothetical
case.
An illustration of the duty of an amateur to act might in-
volve the question of what a traveler would be obligated to do if
he discovered a dangerous condition on a road. If, for example,
such a traveler discovered that a large tree had fallen across the
road on a blind curve, what would be his duty were it probable
that the next traveler on the road would run into the obstacle?
Obviously the duty to remove the tree does not belong to the first
traveler. The removal would be the duty of the owner of the
highway-i.e., the state, if it is a public highway, or the owner of
the land, if it is a private road. The duty might also fall upon the
abutting owner, if the tree were formerly on private land adja-
cent to the highway or road. In any case, the ultimate respon-
sibility is not that of the first traveler. What then are his duties
under the rule? First, if upon reaching the obstruction he sees an-
other traveler proceeding in such a manner as to indicate that he
will hit the obstruction, the first traveler has a duty to warn the
second traveler of the danger. Under the present rule, it seems
that one person does not have a duty to warn another of impend-
ing danger even when it is clear that the second person is unaware
of that danger. A simple "look out" is all that the proposed rule
requires. And in most cases, people do give this warning. In-
deed, giving such a warning is almost a reflex action. Under the
rule, of course, such a warning is required. An emergency exists;
there is no practical alternative for avoiding the danger; failure
to warn would result in substantially more harm than the cost of
warning the endangered person; and the person who is in position
to warn is there by chance.
To agree that there is a duty to warn is the beginning of the
problem. How long and how far does this duty extend? Suppose
that an automobile does not approach immediately. Must the
traveler wait? Clearly, if in some way he can inform the highway
department or the owner of the road that the danger exists, he
has done his duty, except when the danger is imminent. Then
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he may not leave immediately. He may leave only after the
highway department or the owner of the road has had time to
see to the safety of the traveling public. Suppose, however, that
he cannot contact anyone who has the basic responsibility for the
highway. Perhaps after waiting ten minutes, another car ap-
proaches. He signals the driver and tells him of the danger. The
man thanks him profusely and is about to drive on. Our traveler
immediately says that he is leaving, and he tells the new traveler
that the latter now has the duty to warn. The new traveler re-
fuses and drives off.
What then is the first traveler's responsibility? May he be
kept there indefinitely? The answer must, of course, be no. Yet
if he may not be detained indefinitely, how long may he be de-
tained? The law's answer is a reasonable time. Accordingly, in
applying the rule, we see that, when the cost to the person re-
quired to act becomes too great, he is no longer required to act.
In this hypothetical case, then, if the first traveler were unable to
stop anyone, he would only be required to put up the best warning
possible-i.e., a light, a flare, or a smaller obstruction that would
tend to slow down an oncoming driver. He should also stop at
the nearest police station to tell the authorities of the danger.
Certainly, if a policeman were to arrive while the traveler was
still at the scene of the danger, then to inform the policeman of
the danger would be sufficient to carry out the traveler's duty.
In any case, after notifying the person in control that danger
exists, the duty may not then extend to removing the danger but
only to warning the possible victims. If on the other hand it is
impossible thus to ameliorate the danger, then a duty to remove
the danger may exist. Assume that in the hypothetical situation
the best course is to remove the tree and that the first traveler
does remove it. What rights has he? Is he paid for his labor? If
so, by whom? If he is injured while removing the tree, is he
indemnified? If so, by whom? If instead of removing the tree, he
orders a tree company to do so, is he responsible for payment?
And if he is responsible, can he recover such payment from an-
other person?
For the sake of clarity, let us assume that the road is private
and that the owner is known but not available. It is the duty of
the owner, when he knows of a dangerous condition, to take ap-
propriate action either by removing the danger or by warning li-
censees and invitees of such danger.33 Hence our traveler would
83 "As in the case of trespassers, the occupier's duties to licensees are
most curtailed where a mere condition of the premises is the source
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be entitled to payment for the reasonable cost of doing such work
or for having it done. Moreover, if the night were harsh and
cold, then he would be entitled to receive compensation for the
cost of doing the work under extreme conditions. If the job re-
quired professional skill and the work done by the traveler only
partially accomplished the purpose, then he is entitled merely to
the reasonable value of a day laborer's work. Injury to the
traveler while he does the work raises the question of indemnifi-
cation. If he were a professional and had been hired by the
owner to do this work, he would not normally be entitled to in-
demnification, for he would be subject to the defense of assump-
tion of risk. If on the other hand, the owner had hired a young
boy who had not understood the risks, the owner might well be
responsible for the injury. In our case, the traveler is an amateur
who is required by the rule to do some act. Clearly no argu-
ment exists concerning assumption of risk by such a person. The
amount of compensation to which an amateur is entitled, how-
ever, would be lower than that which a professional would receive
for the execution of the task, for the fee charged by the profes-
sional for his services includes an amount necessary to cover the
risk.
But what of the person who refused to stop to help our
traveler? Is he responsible? If under the rule our traveler had a
right to turn over his duty to the second traveler, such a traveler
is mediately responsible. Still, however, the person who has
the ultimate responsibility for the road would also be responsible
to the second traveler.
Suppose in the fallen tree situation that a person had already
been injured because of the obstacle and that the traveler finds
him pinned under a car. Assume further that the most reasonable
step to be taken were to extricate the victim from under the car
of harm. 'An owner of land,' it has been said, 'ordinarily owes no
duty to a licensee, any more than he does to a trespasser, to keep his
premises in a safe condition, because the licensee or trespasser must
take the premises as he finds them and assumes the risk of any danger
arising out of their condition.' Thus the occupier need not inspect
the premises to discover defects or other dangerous conditions. If,
however, he learns of such a condition and should realize that it is
unreasonably dangerous to a licensee, and if the occupier 'cannot
reasonably assume that the licensee knows [of the condition], or by a
reasonable use of his faculties would observe' it, then the occupier
is under the duty to use due care to avoid the injury, either by re-
moving the danger or by giving reasonable warning of its presence."
James, Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed to Licensees
and Invitees, 63 YALE L.J. 605, 606 (1954).
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and that in doing so our traveler were injured. Who is respon-
sible? The victim or the owner of the land?
First, it is clear that the injured person is or would have been
benefited by the acts of the traveler. The injured person could
have and, if asked by the traveler, would have contracted to have
the traveler help him. We realize that except when medical help
is the help furnished, some courts have refused to recognize either
an implied or expressed contract for the care of an injured per-
son.3 4 Under our rule, however, since one person is required to
act for the benefit of another who is in danger, a legal arrange-
ment with rights and duties arises. What are the terms of this
arrangement? If the services required are the services of a pro-
fessional and if a professional supplies them, then the price would
be the customary charge for the service. And if the professional
is injured, there is no need to indemnify him, since the cost re-
lating to the risk of injury is included in the professional's charge.
An entirely different problem arises when the person who
has a duty to act has no special skills. How do we compensate
him if he is injured? We cannot treat him as the law now treats
the volunteer because unlike the volunteer, he has a duty to act.
This duty would negate any assumption of risk simply because the
actor has no choice. Quite clearly then, a person who acts non-
negligently in accordance with the rule and who is injured
thereby must be indemnified for the injury. If such is the rule,
then who must indemnify him? Obviously the persons whom
the actor hoped to or did benefit. Thus in our hypothetical
situation, the person pinned under a tree is the person whom the
actor hopes to benefit. The victim is, therefore, at least mediately
responsible. If, however, some other person caused the injury to
the victim, then that person is ultimately responsible to the actor
who is injured in his attempt to help the victim. For even
under the present law, such a person is responsible to mitigate or
alleviate damage or injuries caused by him to another.-5
34 Falcke v. Scottish Imperial Ins. Co., 34 Ch. D. 234, 248 (1886), where
Lord Bowen said, "The general principle is, beyond all question, that
work and labor done or money expended by one man to preserve or
benefit the property of another do not according to English law create
any lien upon the property saved or benefited, nor, even if standing
alone, create any obligation to repay the expenditure. Liabilities are
not to be forced upon people behind their backs any more than you
can confer a benefit upon a man against his will."
35 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 322 (1934) provides: "If the actor by his tor-
tious conduct has caused such bodily harm to another as to make him
helpless, the actor is under a duty to use reasonable care to prevent
524 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 44, NO. 3
But all attempts to aid a victim may not be helpful to
the person ultimately responsible. For example, in a state with a
limitation on recovery for wrongful death, the saving of the vic-
tim's life by a third party might result in a higher instead of a
lower verdict against the person ultimately responsible. 36 To
any further harm which the actor then realizes or should realize as
threatening the other."
"The words 'further harm' include not only an entirely new harm
due to the dangerous position in which the other has been placed by
the actor's tortious act . . . but also any increase in the original harm
caused by the failure to give assistance . . . and any protraction of
the harm which prompt attention would have prevented .... " RE-
STATEMENT, TORTS § 322, comment b (1934).
This rule is well illustrated by the following hypothetical: "A
and B are both driving carelessly along a lonely ill-lighted road. In
consequence, a collision occurs by which B is thrown out of the car
into the middle of the road, bleeding profusely and unconscious. A
drives on without giving B any attention. A could easily have checked
the flow of blood by applying a tourniquet. His failure to do so re-
sults in B's death. A is liable under a death statute." RESTATEMENT,
TORTS § 322, illustration 4 (1934). "The rule stated in this Section
expresses a duty of affirmative action imposed upon the actor because
his tortious conduct has rendered the other helpless. The rule is
not an extension of the principle of 'legal cause' nor an extension of
the doctrine of 'last clear chance.'" RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 322, com-
ment e (1934). See also Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 299 (1961).
Some states have statutes making it the duty of the nonnegligent
driver to aid his negligent counterpart in an auto accident. Once this
duty is established, all the considerations raised by our proposed rule
apply to such a legally imposed duty to act. These statutes are an
important first step in imposing a general duty to act, because no
valid distinction can be drawn between an innocent participant in
an accident and a bystander in their duty to an accident victim.
36 "The result was that it was more profitable for the defendant to kill
the plaintiff than to scratch him, and that the most grievous of all
injuries left the bereaved family of the victim, who frequently were
destitute, without a remedy. Since this was intolerable, it was changed
in England by the passage of the Fatal Accidents Act of 1846, other-
wise known as Lord Campbell's Act, which has become a generic
name for similar statutes. Every American state now has a statutory
remedy for wrongful death. Most of the statutes were modeled upon
Lord Campbell's Act, which is a 'death act,' and creates a new cause
of action for the death in favor of the decedent's personal representa-
tive for the benefit of certain designated persons." PROSSER, op. cit.
supra note 25, § 121, at 924.
"Under rather less than one-third of the death acts, the discretion
of the jury is at least partly controlled by a maximum limit of recovery
on behalf of all beneficiaries for a single death. These amounts, how-
ever, vary considerably under the different statutes." PROSSER, op. cit.
supra note 25, § 121, at 932. (Emphasis added.)
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state this proposition is to show its fallaciousness, for if the tort-
feasor himself refused aid in such circumstances, he would be
responsible in most jurisdictions both in tort and criminally. We
can conclude, therefore, that he who is responsible for indemni-
fying a person who is injured in performance of a duty to act is
the same person who must compensate him for acting. In other
words, the person who would have been benefited if the actor
had accomplished his purpose must also indemnify the actor if he
is injured while fulfilling his duty to act.
INTERMEDDLERS
Whether the rule extends to compensating intermeddlers or
to indemnifying them for their injuries is a question of major
significance, since damages in a situation where indemnification is
required could far exceed the benefit to the person whom the
actor attempts to help. Because the question of the officious in-
termeddler is involved in the operation and extent of the rule, it
can best be discussed through illustrations of the operation of the
rule. In each case the question will arise as to whether it is
reasonable for a person to act under the given circumstances.
Obviously it is unreasonable for a person to attempt to save
another person's fifty-dollar watch at the risk of his life, nor does
our rule require that he do so. The rule requires a person to act
only if the cost or loss to him is disproportionately less than the
loss or harm he could prevent by acting. Under this rule, one
would not be required to act at the risk of his life in order to save
a fifty-dollar watch. A concomitant rule would be that no one
would be required to indemnify him if he were injured while so
acting. The actor would be treated (as under the law he is now
treated) either as a mere volunteer or as an officious intermeddler.
The problem then is not that of officious intermeddlers but
of the reasonableness of the person who acts. Undoubtedly
man's motives are neither completely selfish nor completely un-
selfish, but the application of this rule does require an investiga-
tion of motives. Hence a judgment could be made on the basis
of the facts known to the actor at the time he decided either to
act or not to act. Because of the emergency nature of the cir-
cumstances, however, he must be given the benefit of the doubt,
and he must not be judged by hindsight. Such judgment is
difficult, but judgment of this sort is rendered presently in every
area where persons are now required to act (e.g., under laws re-
lating to public officials, servants of public utilities, and simple
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negligence) 3 Certainly decisions in this area will be no more
difficult than in any other area of law.
But what happens when the result of the act is not beneficial
but in fact makes matters worse either by further injuring the
victim or by injuring the actor? First, we can safely say that the
ordinary rules of negligence would apply in the same way that
they do under the present rule. If the person required to act
negligently injures the victim he is attempting to save, then he is
liable for the consequences. But the standard of care required is
only what is reasonable under the circumstances. If on the other
hand, the actor negligently injures himself, the victim would not
(as he was required to do for a nonnegligent injury) be required
to indemnify the victim. These rules do not solve the problem,
however, when there has been no benefit to the victim. In
admiralty law, persons salvaging are paid only if they benefit the
owners. 38  Even in the normal quantum meruit case, payment is
37 "The courts have been compelled to recognize that an actor who is
confronted with an emergency is not to be held to the standard of
conduct normally applied to one who is in no such situation. An
emergency has been defined as a sudden or unexpected event or
combination of circumstances which calls for immediate action; and
although there are courts which have laid stress upon the 'instinc-
tive action' which usually accompanies such a situation, it seems clear
that the basis of the special rule is merely that the actor is left no time
for thought, or is reasonably so disturbed or excited, that he cannot
weigh alternative courses of action, and must make a speedy decision,
based very largely upon impulse or guess. Under such conditions,
the actor cannot reasonably be held to the same conduct as one who
has had full opportunity to reflect, even though it later appears that
he made the wrong decision, which no reasonable man could possibly
have made after due deliberation. His choice 'may be mistaken and
yet prudent.'" PRossER, op. cit. supra note 25, § 33, at 171-72.
38 "First, there must be a service to maritime property which is in real or
impending danger. Secondly, the service must be voluntary in nature.
Thirdly, there must be at least partial success in saving property, or
a proximate contribution to the ultimate success. ...
"The antiquity of salvage is the antiquity of maritime trade itself.
Since the seas were the primary highways of commerce when mari-
time customs were developing, merchants and traders influenced the
evolution of maritime law. The earliest maritime codes speak of
salvage awards as proportions of property saved, and give no con-
sideration to any award for saving lives. The law of salvage was
intended to motivate the saving of property for the benefit of owner
and salvor alike, and experience quickly proved a material reward
to be the most efficacious method of achieving that end. Consequently,
the salvor has a lien of highest priority upon the property saved,
whether ship or cargo. This lien accrues immediately upon the per-
formance of the service, and gives the salvor a right to proceed in rem
against the property itself. If necessary, the property may be sold,
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only for a benefit.89 But such rules do not seem appropriate in
a situation where a person is required to act. In such a case, the
pay should be the same whether the actor is successful or unsuc-
cessful.
Although the example of the traveler sets out the main prin-
ciples of the rule, it does not exemplify all aspects of the rule.
One still must ask: What happens when the action benefits the
actor more than the person allegedly benefited? What rights does
a person have to allow his property to decay? And in the alter-
native case, does the right to abate a nuisance involve a duty to do
so? In order to explore more fully the application of this rule
and its ramifications, we must consider the following hypotheti-
cal cases.
Hypothetical Case I: A person, either the contiguous owner
or a stranger, sees a broken section of fence which previously
enclosed a herd of cattle. What are his duties?
Hypothetical Case II: Perishables, say twelve crates of let-
tuce, are delivered to the wrong business address. What action
must be taken by the person who discovers the perishables?
Hypothetical Case I: A passing stranger discovers a dis-
eased elm tree in a neighborhood where there are many elm trees
that are free of disease. What action must such a person take?
Hypothetical Case IV: A garage mechanic who is hired for
a motor tune-up notices that the brakes are badly worn. What
action must be taken?
Hypothetical Case V: A passing stranger sees a person who
is obviously drunk attempt to start his car in a busy part of town.
What action must be taken?
Hypothetical Case VI: A customer in a restaurant notices a
puddle of salad oil on the floor. What duty does he have?
In the first hypothetical, what is the rule when a person sees
a fence broken and valuable cattle escaping? Clearly he has a
duty to notify the owner. But what if he does so and the warning
is ineffective, or what if he cannot contact the owner? Is he re-
quired to hire a crew either to round up the cattle or to fix the
fence? First, let us consider the contiguous owner. In such a case,
the duty to act coincides with the duty of the contiguous owner
and the salvor may have his claim satisfied from the proceeds of the
sale." Jarett, The Life Salvor Problem in Admiralty, 63 YALE L.J.
779, 780-81 (1954).
89 See Annot., 59 A.L.R. 604 (1929); 58 Am. JuP. Work and Labor § 35(1948).
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to protect his own property. The cost of fixing the fence or herd-
ing the cattle is, of course, chargeable to the original owner if
the original owner had a duty to keep his animals on his own
land. If instead of a contiguous owner a third party were to see
the animals escaping, he would probably have a duty both to the
original owner and to the contiguous owner. The contiguous
owner, however, would only be mediately responsible. The origi-
nal owner would be ultimately responsible. Assume that the
third person could contact neither the owner nor the contiguous
owner and that he attempted to hire a fence repairman who
either refused to act or asked for a guarantee for his fee. What
remains for the stranger to do? Applying the rule to such a
situation, the stranger must act unless the cost of repairs is dis-
proportionately more than the savings to be made. Since his duty
arose fortuitously, he would be responsible to the repairman who
finally did act, but he would be able to charge either the owner,
who is ultimately responsible, or the contiguous owner, who is
mediately responsible, for the cost of the repairs. This answer
assumes that a proper judgment was made and that the cost of
saving the cattle and fixing the fence was considerably less than
the value of the cattle.
What to do about the perishable lettuce raises a similar ques-
tion. In this case, it can be assumed that the owner does not want
the goods to spoil. The major difference between this case and
that of the cattle is that the rotting of the lettuce would not
cause damage to other property. In the cattle case, on the other
hand, the owner has a duty to stop such damage, and in certain
cases he could probably be enjoined from allowing his cattle to
run. In the case of the perishable lettuce, again the most obvious
action is to notify the owner. And if the owner or the person
who is responsible for delivering the goods can be notified, the
duty to act is complete. Then either the owner or the person
who misdelivered the goods would be responsible for the lettuce,
and if they wished that the lettuce rot, it would be their business.
But what happens if no one is available to give directions? The
goods must be sold for the best price reasonably available, and
the proceeds, less expenses, must be turned over to the owner.40
40 The procedure required under the proposed rule is the same procedure
required by NEB. REV. STAT., T.C.C. § 2-603 (1964): "Merchant buyer's
duties as to rightfully rejected goods.
"(1) Subject to any security interest in the buyer (subsection (3)
of section 2-711), when the seller has no agent or place of business
at the market of rejection a merchant buyer is under a duty after
rejection of goods in his possession or control to follow any reasonable
instructions received from the seller with respect to the goods and in
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The third hypothetical, which involves the spread of dutch
elm disease, raises the issue of officious intermeddling. If the
disease were not contagious and if it would not spread to another's
property, the only duty would be to contact the owner of the
diseased tree. Once the owner is informed, no further action
would be necessary, because the law recognizes the right of a
person to destroy his own property. If the owner could not be
found, then other action would be required, providing that the
cost of such action would be disproportionately less than the loss
to be averted by acting. Such action would probably include
calling a tree surgeon. The persons benefited (i.e., the actual
owner and the contiguous owners) would be ultimately respon-
sible, and the actor would be mediately responsible to the person
called to help. Assume, however, that the first tree surgeon con-
tacted by the actor refused to come, that a second tree surgeon
was called, and that neither the contiguous owners nor the actual
owner had funds to pay the bill. The first tree surgeon would
then have to indemnify the second tree surgeon for the cost of
destroying the diseased tree. This is, of course, the same case as
that of the doctor described above who must indemnify a second
doctor for the cost of treating a patient whom the first doctor
refused to treat.
Since in the present case more than the actual owner's in-
terest is involved, the duty of a third party to act does not run
exclusively to the owner. The actor can, therefore, satisfy his
duty by informing a contiguous owner or, in most jurisdictions, a
public official. The power of interested individuals and public
officials to abate a nuisance is indisputable.41 Hence if the actor
is a stranger, he would only be required to inform a proper party.
The cost distribution of averting the danger would follow the
method now provided for abating nuisances. If the owner refuses
the absence of such instructions to make reasonable efforts to sell
them for the sellers account if they are perishable or threaten to de-
cline in value speedily. Instructions are not reasonable if on demand
indemnity for expenses is not forthcoming.
"(2) When the buyer sells goods under subsection (1), he is en-
titled to reimbursement from the seller or out of the proceeds for
reasonable expenses of caring for and selling them, and if the expenses
include no selling commission then to such commission as is usual in
the trade or if there is none to a reasonable sum not exceeding ten
per cent on the gross proceeds.
"(3) In complying with this section the buyer is held only to good
faith and good faith conduct hereunder is neither acceptance nor con-
version nor the basis of an action for damages."
41 RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 201-03 (1934).
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or is unable to act, the public official or a person who is injured
by the nuisance may act and may then charge the cost to the
owner.
42
The fourth hypothetical (that of the garage mechanic who
discovers faulty brakes) involves the same principles. Thus the
owner of a car may not wish to repair it, but that he should have
the right to drive a car with improper brakes is absurd. Indeed,
such action is considered criminal in most jurisdictions. Hence
when the mechanic discovers the faulty brakes, he must either
inform the owner of the defect or he must repair the brakes.
Furthermore, the mechanic may have a duty to inform the police
if after advising the owner of the defect, the owner refused to
repair the brakes and intended to drive with improper brakes. 43
42 City of San Antonio v. Mackey's Estate, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 145, 54 S.W.
33 (1899).
43 See Broeder, Silence and Perjury Before Police Officers, 40 NEB. L.
REv. 63, 64-65 (1960), where he states:
"The conventional answer, however, is misleading. While the
part about misdemeanors is true-the law has never, except perhaps
in the case of law enforcement officers, imposed any affirmative duty
to report misdemeanors, regardless of the circumstances-the matter
as to treason and felonies is not nearly so clear cut. As a matter of
fact, nothing about the subject seems ever to have been altogether
clear, and modern American authority at least would seem to compel
the drawing of various distinctions. Much may depend, for example,
on whether we are speaking about a simple failure to disclose felonies
to the authorities with no intention on defendant's part of aiding the
felon or of profiting from his silence or of impeding a police investi-
gation or on whether such factors are present. Other distinctions may
also occasionally be important. There is some reason to believe, for
instance, that failing to disclose, information concerning another per-
son's felonies when requested to do so by law enforcement officers
may be quite different from simply failing to volunteer information,
that law enforcement officers are perhaps dealt with differently in
this area from other people and that various groups of persons who
might otherwise be subject to criminal liability for failing to speak
out may be protected because of their businesses or professions or be-
cause of the way in which information concerning the felonies comes
to their attention. ...
"Probably it is best to begin with the history and the English law
on the question. Such distinguished common law commentators as
Coke, Hale, Hawkins, East and Blackstone unqualifiedly asserted that
a simple failure without any ulterior purpose to disclose another's
felony to the authorities was punishable as a common law misde-
meanor-known as misprision of felony-and that it was a misde-
meanor even to stand by and watch a felony without at least attempt-
ing to prevent it and this latter apparently without regard to the
bystander's ability effectively to intervene. And such statements,
particularly as regards the criminality of failing to disclose felonies
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The fifth hypothetical case (that of the drunken driver) pre-
sents a problem similar to that of the garage mechanic. The only
difference is that because of voluntary drunkenness, the driver
cannot be made aware of the danger. If the person who sees
the drunk is a member of his family or either a tavern keeper or
a social host who has contributed to his drunkenness, 44 such a
person would have a duty to act even though his presence is not
fortuitous. Our rule applies only when the person who sees the
drunk is a stranger. Undoubtedly a warning will not be heeded
by the drunk. Hence since the public as well as the drunk are
involved, a warning to the police would be the appropriate action.
A problem arises only when the police are unavailable. Then
the only appropriate action would be an attempt to stop the
drunk by force. Part two of the rule would here be applicable.
In accordance with part two, if the possibility existed of substan-
tial physical danger to the actor, he would have no duty to act.
Hypothetical case number six illustrates the fact that in most
cases the duty to act is merely a duty to warn. If a customer
notices a dangerous condition, i.e., a puddle of salad oil on the
floor of a restaurant, what must he do? He must warn the own-
ers of the store or, if someone were about to walk near the oil,
he must warn such a person.
In view of the preceding illustrations, it is clear that the ap-
plication of this rule is no more difficult than the application of
any other rule. But in questions of diffuse responsibility, appli-
cation of this rule is somewhat more complex.
to the authorities, have many times been repeated by later English
and American commentators so as to give them almost the force and
effect of law."
44 The duty in such cases may be inferred from the liability imposed
upon such persons by Dram Shop Laws. See, e.g., IL,. STAT. ANN.
cl. 43, § 135 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1964):
"Every person, who shall be injured, in person or property by any
intoxicated person, shall have a right of action in his or her own
name, severally or jointly, against any person or persons who shall,
by selling or giving alcoholic liquor, have caused the intoxication, in
whole or in part, of such person; and any person owning, renting,
leasing or permitting the occupation of any building or premises, and
having knowledge that alcoholic liquors are to be sold therein, or
who having leased the same for other purposes, shall knowingly per-
mit therein the sale of any alcoholic liquors that have caused, in
whole or in part, the intoxication of any person, shall be liable, sev-
erally or jointly, with the person or persons selling or giving liquors
aforesaid. .. "
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DIFFUSE RESPONSIBILITY
In the emergency setting, diffuse responsibility is exempli-
fied by the hypothetical case of the drowning man at the crowded
beach. The presence of all the people at the beach is fortuitous,
and the danger, at least to persons with swimming ability, is sub-
stantially less than the danger to the drowning man if nothing is
done. Clearly the persons with the most ability to swim have a
greater duty because to such persons the risk is less than to
nonswimmers. If a professional life guard were present, he alone
would have the duty. But if no life guard were present, then
all able swimmers would have a duty to save the drowning man.
Yet what would happen if everyone refused to act? Before dis-
cussing this problem, we must decide what happens to one who
does act in the emergency.
If such a person saves the drowning swimmer, he is entitled
to compensation. His claim would be against the person bene-
fited. Our prior analysis has shown that the person primarily
liable is the drowning man. But if he had been put into the
dangerous position by the negligent action of another person, then
that other person would be liable. Thus if either the person
saved or the person who caused the danger can pay the fee, no
further problem exists.
The same answer applies to indemnification in the event that
the rescuer is injured or drowned. If such is the case, he or his
estate must be indemnified by the person benefited. If, however,
the drowning man is not saved and dies penniless and if no other
person contributed to the drowning, who is to pay the would-be
rescuer for his injuries and trouble? To answer this question,
we may return to the example of the doctor. In that case, if the
first doctor refused to act, the second doctor could look to the first
in the event that he was unable to collect from the person bene-
fited. This procedure must also apply to questions of diffuse
responsibility, though no one person in a group of equally quali-
fied persons would seem to have a greater duty to act than the
others (as would be the circumstance in our example of the clinic
doctors). For in such cases it would seem that all would be
equally liable. Thus if the swimmer who attempted to save the
drowning man were drowned in the attempt, the remaining swim-
mers could be held responsible to the estate of the rescuer. If no
one acted, however, the entire group of swimmers would be liable
to the estate of the deceased victim on the same basis. This rule
could and should be applied in all cases of diffuse responsibility
whether they come under the duty to act in emergencies or not.
For the emergency rule merely establishes the duty to act, where-
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as the duty to contribute should apply whenever the law finds
that all members of a group are equally responsible for a certain
duty. Thus contribution should be required for the upkeep of a
common stairway just as contributions should be required from
all children in a support of parents case.45
Clearly, then, diffuse responsibility can be difficult only if
the law refuses to recognize contribution. We realize that in
some situations it will be difficult to know all of the persons who
might have the duty, but in such cases the group will be large,
and the hardship of contributing will be small. That there
should be no contribution by persons equally liable is un-
just, and the mere fact that the conventional tort rule does not
permit contribution should not govern the apportionment of dam-
ages under the proposed rule. Courts should not be required to
apply undesirable old rules to new situations. Here they would
have the opportunity to limit a rule which is generally considered
unfair.
RELATED PROBLEMS
The preceding discussion relates strictly to the proposed rule.
In that discussion, we have claimed that the suggested change of
the common law rule of no duty to act was not an attempt
to alter the present economic distribution of goods in society,
and we believe that an examination of the changes to be
wrought by the adoption of this rule will bear us out. Neverthe-
less, an adoption of this rule will cause at least some reconsidera-
tion of certain other rules of law. Basically the areas of law that
are most closely related to the problems of the duty to act are the
last clear chance rule, the duty of the sovereign to compensate for
the use of personal goods or services, and the application of the
proximate cause rule to this new duty to act.
First, let us look at the rule concerning the last clear chance.
As stated above, the application of this rule has led to a mass of
incoherent, illogical decisions. 46 Fortunately, however, the prob-
45 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 68-101, -102 (Reissue 1958).
46 PROSSER, TORTS § 65, at 443 (3d ed. 1964) summarizes the criticism as
follows:
"This variety of irreconcilable rules, all purporting to be the same,
and the lack of any rational fundamental theory to support them,
suggest that the 'last clear chance' doctrine is more a matter of dis-
satisfaction with the defense of contributory negligence than anything
else. In its application, it is not infrequent that the greater the de-
fendant's negligence, the less his liability will be. The driver who
looks carefully and discovers the danger, and is then slow in applying
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lem posed by the last clear chance rule may be easily solved by
the adoption of the present rule. By definition, the facts in a last
clear chance situation always indicate an emergency, for the per-
son required to act is the only person who can avoid the accident.
What happens then when our rule is applied to a last clear
chance situation? Suppose that a bus full of passengers is ap-
proaching a child who is playing in the street. Assume that the
child is negligently attended and that the bus is proceeding
nonnegligently. Thus only action by the bus driver can save the
child. Must the driver act? Yes, if by so acting the danger to
himself, his passengers, and his cargo is disproportionately less
than the harm to be avoided. Assume then that the driver acts to
save the child, and that because of his action, five passengers re-
ceive whiplash injuries and some valuable glass carried by the bus
is broken. Under the rule, the child or the person who negligently
let the child wander into the street is ultimately responsible for
all of the damages. But in the event that such persons are im-
pecunious, who is mediately responsible? It must be assumed
that the bus company is mediately responsible. Under the normal
carriage contract for hire, the carrier is an insurer against loss
except for acts of the sovereign, acts of God, and acts of the public
enemy. The carrier would be responsible for the damage resulting
from acts required under the rule. The same criterion would
apply in the case of personal injury. For the rule that the highest
degree of care is required of common carriers would probably
result in liability of the carrier. In the latter circumstance, a
caveat must, however, be issued if the danger to the passengers
were of a certain magnitude. For the driver would not then have
a duty to act since the danger to the driver, to his cargo, and to
his passengers would not be disproportionately less than the dan-
ger to be avoided. In the preceding case, mediate responsibility
would shift to the passengers if, for example, they were guests
instead of paid passengers. The guests in such a case would have
to bear the loss if the loss to them was substantially less than
the harm avoided. Thus it appears that the proposed rule works
his brakes, may be liable, while the one who does not look at all, or
who has no effective brakes to apply, may not. Recognition of the
absurdity of such distinctions has played a considerable part in the
extension of the doctrine to new situations. Nor is it easy to defend
a rule which absolves the plaintiff entirely from his own negligence,
and places the loss upon the defendant, whose fault may be the les-
ser of the two. It is probable that the future development of the law
of contributory negligence will lie along the lines of statutory or com-
mon law apportionment of the damages, rather than the last clear
chance."
THE DUTY TO ACT: A PROPOSED RULE
consistently within the present legal rules and that unlike the
present last clear chance rule, it is applicable to problems related
to damage to third parties and to the defendant actor.
Another related problem is the duty of citizens to act on the
command of the sovereign. This is another exception to the
present rule of no duty to act. Under the present law, a citizen
must give both his time and property to the state when in an
emergency the sovereign calls upon him to do so. Thus a police-
man may order a citizen to help chase a fleeing felon even at the
risk of loss of property and life to the person required to act.47
Again, in time of war, the state may requisition goods and serv-
ices as easily as it may draft men into the armed forces. The
same rule applies in cases of natural disasters such as fires or
floods. In such cases, the state may call upon all citizens to act
and under certain circumstances, may even destroy private prop-
erty. Because this exception to the no duty to act rule has not
been thought out either as a rule of law or as a constitutional
matter, no compensation is normally paid to persons who lose
property, life, or health. There have been a few cases, however, in
which workmen's compensation has been paid to a person required
by the police to aid them in pursuance of their duty.48 If prop-
erly analyzed, all action required by the state of its citizens (either
in giving services or property) should be compensable under the
fifth amendment. Under that amendment, the state has no right
to require property or service without the payment of compen-
sation.49 This rule of compensation could, and probably should,
47 See, e.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-728 (Reissue 1964): "Whoever, having
been called upon by the sheriff or other ministerial officer, in any
county in this state, to assist such officer or other officer in appre-
hending any person charged with or convicted of any offense against
any of the laws of this state, or in securing such offender when ap-
prehended . . . neglects or refuses to render such assistance, shall be
fined in any sum not exceeding fifty dollars." See also ALA. CODE
tit. 14, § 404 (1940); ARmz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-542 (1956); CAL. PEN.
CODE § 150; OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 537 (1951); Wyo. STAT. § 6-181(1957). See generally Note, The Private Person's Duty to Assist the
Police in Arrest, 13 Wyo. L.J. 72 (1958).
48 See, e.g., Riker v. City of New York, 204 Misc. 878, 126 N.Y.S.2d 229
(Sup. Ct. 1953); Industrial Comm'n of Ohio v. Turek, 129 Ohio St.
545, 196 N.E. 382 (1935); Blackman v. City of Cincinnati, 66 Ohio App.
495, 35 N.E.2d 164 (1941).
49 "Most courts have held these provisions [forbidding the taking of
property without just compensation] to be self-executing, so that
even where the legislature fails to provide a procedure for prosecuting
such claims against the state, an action may be maintained in the
courts to recover compensation .... " James, Tort Liability of Gov-
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apply to situations not involving emergencies, such as wrongful
imprisonment and interrogation of either alleged criminals or in-
sane persons.
Under the proposed rule, every citizen in a disaster area
would have a duty to act. At the same time, such a person would
be entitled to compensation for his services and indemnification
for any losses or damages suffered while acting for the public
good. Thus, in an epidemic, doctors could be mobilized and
drugs requisitioned. In a flood situation, individuals could be
drafted to man dikes, and property could be destroyed in order
to save lives and other property. This power to save the com-
munity at the expense of the individual exists under the present
law, but the existing law makes little or no provision for com-
pensating those who are engaged in the work of saving the com-
munity. Moreover, in most cases relief is given only through
private legislation or administrative claims provisions. Under the
rule, however, the cost of this service would be assessed against
the person helped. In the case of disasters such as floods and
fires, the cost would be assessed against the governmental unit
charged with the duty of protecting the area affected by the nat-
ural disaster. In the event that an agency other than God negli-
gently causes a disaster, the rule would require that the cost be
assessed against that agency.
A duty to act rule already partially applies in the public
disaster field. The proposed rule would rationalize its applica-
tion. Moreover, the proposed rule would provide for a fair dis-
tribution of losses sustained in such a disaster. And under the
proposed rule, no changes would be made in determining how
losses from a disaster are to be borne, but the full costs of com-
bating the disaster would be shifted to the state or to the agency
of the state which was authorized to act in the emergency situa-
tion. Adoption of the rule is thus consistent with the general
trend of the law of torts toward the socialization of costs and
away from arbitrating allocation of losses.
SUMMARY
Adoption of the proposed rule will do little to change the
behavior of the individual, except insofar as it might create an
ernmental Units and Their Officers, 22 U. Cm. L. REv. 610, 618 (1955).
For a modern application of this principle see the action of Judge
William East's order to the United States to pay a lawyer ordered to
defend an indigent. Time Magazine, July 10, 1964, p. 46.
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environment in which he could be a better citizen. But the rule
will protect and compensate the few good samaritans who are
sometimes penalized for their virtues. Moreover, the rule will
not turn anyone into a busybody, for the consideration of rea-
sonableness of action will not allow more protection to the really
officious intermeddler than he now has under the law. Nor will
such a rule cause persons to fear for their property because of an
act they inadvertently failed to do, since in most cases our mar-
velously complex economy has provided specialists who perform
such acts. And since the circumstances of a real emergency
will always be clear and the action required will be performed
instinctively, in practically all such situations the rule will simply
protect the man who acts as society expects him to act.
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